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█ Riassunto  Il nuovo mistero di Searle, ovvero: come non risolvere il problema della coscienza – John Searle ha 
più volte affermato di aver risolto il problema mente-corpo, in particolar modo per quel che riguarda il mi-
stero della coscienza. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è presentare e analizzare la sua teoria del naturalismo biolo-
gico, dalla sua prima formulazione, alla metà degli anni ’80, sino alle sue ultime manifestazioni. La nostra 
analisi mostrerà che il naturalismo biologico di Searle presenta molti problemi teorici e incongruenze logi-
che, che non depongono a suo favore come buona spiegazione sia per il problema della coscienza sia per il 
problema mente/cervello. In definitiva, lungi dall’offrire una soluzione al problema della coscienza, Searle 
finisce col fare della coscienza un nuovo mistero. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: John Searle; Coscienza; Naturalismo biologico; Problema mente-corpo; Filosofia della mente. 
 
█ Abstract  John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the mind-brain problem, especially as 
regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of bio-
logical naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that 
Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, which 
disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. We conclude that, far 
from offering a solution to the problem of consciousness, Searle ended up creating a new mystery of con-
sciousness. 
KEYWORDS: John Searle; Consciousness; Biological Naturalism; Mind-Body Problem; Philosophy of Mind. 

 
 
JOHN SEARLE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED as one 
of the most original and influential philoso-
phers of recent decades. His undeniable style, 
his sharp criticism of intellectual fashions and 
absurd theories as well as his philosophical 
proposal of presenting a unified theory for all 
of human reality, have attracted many sympa-
thizers and supporters. A contemporary phi-
losopher has even claimed that «his work rep-
resents a new way of doing philosophy».1 
The range of topics discussed by Searle is, 
indeed, impressive, even bringing to mind the 
philosophers of the late nineteenth century and 
their ambition of system-building. Following 
the Oxford analytical tradition of the mid-
twentieth century, Searle began his career in 
the field of the philosophy of language, devel-
oping a theory of speech acts from the early 
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works of John Austin.2 However, some years 
later, he began to realize that language itself, 
though crucial to philosophy, needed a non-
linguistic basis, which led him to address issues 
in the so-called philosophy of mind and to the 
investigation of the biological and psychologi-
cal aspects of human beings.3 From the second 
half of the 1990s, he turned his attention to so-
ciety and its institutions, in search of a social 
ontology.4  
Since then, he has revised and developed his 
initial positions, seeking to integrate all of his 
analyses into a general theory of reality.5 
This brief overview of Searle’s work serves 
as a warning and general indication that, within 
the space limits established here, it is impossi-
ble to analyze his thinking as a whole, unless, of 
course, in a caricatural way. Therefore, what I 
propose to do here is something much more 
modest, significantly restricting the scope of 
my analysis.  
I will present and discuss in its essential as-
pects Searle’s biological naturalism, namely, his 
alleged solution to the mind-body problem, es-
pecially in regard to consciousness.6 In fact, he 
firmly believes that he has transformed the mys-
tery of consciousness into the problem of con-
sciousness by treating it as a natural biological 
phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis.  
To conduct my analysis, I will follow this 
path: 1) initially, I will explain the meaning of 
the term “biological naturalism” in the context 
of the philosophy of mind; 2) then I will outline 
Searle’s theory of intentionality and its connec-
tion with biological naturalism; 3) third, I will 
analyze specifically how Searle addresses the 
question of consciousness; 4) finally, I will dis-
cuss what I consider to be the main obstacles to 
this approach. 
 
█ The definition of biological naturalism 
 
The term “naturalism”, although widely 
used in scientific and philosophical discussions 
since the twentieth century, does not always 
designate a single theory or idea. In a very gen-
eral sense, we can say that it designates a kind 
of philosophical monism, by rejecting all forms 
of dualism.7 However, when we turn our atten-
tion to its more specific meaning, we no longer 
find a single characterization. On the contrary, 
there is little or no consensus regarding its 
meaning, as acknowledged by one of its con-
temporary defenders.8 We should, therefore, 
always pay attention to the meaning it acquires 
in each specific context of use. 
In spite, however, of the lack of a consensu-
al definition, it is possible to at least outline a 
more general classificatory framework, in order 
to delimit, albeit incompletely, some conceptu-
al limits to the use of the term. In general, we 
can distinguish between ontological and meth-
odological naturalism.9 In the former, emphasis 
is placed on the structure and contents of reali-
ty. In other words, on clearly stating what type 
of thing exists or does not exist (e.g., trees exist, 
angels and disembodied spirits do not exist). In 
the latter, only a commitment to how to inves-
tigate and obtain knowledge of reality is estab-
lished, maintaining a neutral stance with re-
spect to ontological questions (e.g., regardless 
of what the ultimate reality of things is or 
should be, we can only know something about 
the real world through science). What is im-
portant is to safeguard the authority of the sci-
entific method and of the empirical sciences.  
Also useful for our purposes is the distinc-
tion suggested by Craig and Moreland10 be-
tween “strong naturalism” and “weak natural-
ism”: the former corresponds to a strict physi-
calism and is directed toward the description 
and/or explanation of all phenomena in terms 
of physics, chemistry or biology, whereas the 
latter concedes the existence of properties 
and/or irreducible emergent entities, such as, 
for example, the mind and consciousness. 
Based on these preliminary considerations, 
we can then begin our analysis of Searle’s pro-
posal. In a recent paper, entitled “Biological 
Naturalism” intended to explain consciousness 
as a biological phenomenon, the philosopher 
clarifies his position as follows: «“biological 
naturalism” is the name I have given to an ap-
proach to what is traditionally called the 
“mind-body problem”»; more specifically – he 
adds – «biological naturalism is a theory of 
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mental states in general».11  
From this simple statement, we can deduce 
that Searle’s naturalism is first and foremost an 
ontological naturalism, as its central concern is 
to present a solution to the problem of the real 
relationship between the mind and the brain. 
In other words, Searle wants to explain what 
the mind, consciousness, beliefs, etc. are, which 
presupposes, therefore, the acceptance of their 
existence. But the adjective “biological” means 
something more, namely, that Searle wants to 
explain them as part of biology, which suggests, 
in principle, a strong naturalism. However, this 
first impression soon reveals itself as inade-
quate. Later in that same text, we find him de-
fending emergentism, first-person ontology, 
the irreducibility and the causal efficacy of con-
sciousness, which leads us to classify his pro-
posal as a weak naturalism. Now, the question 
immediately arises of whether and in what 
sense it would be possible to sustain a weak bio-
logical naturalism without dualism. 
Before answering this question, which in my 
view is crucial to Searle’s entire undertaking, it 
is necessary to analyze in greater detail the 
foundations and the general articulation of the 
central elements of his approach. This is what 
we shall do in the following two sections. 
 
█ Intentionality and the mind-brain problem 
 
As some interpreters of Searle’s work have 
aptly noted, the notion of intentionality is the 
central element in his thinking.12 Not only bio-
logical naturalism, but his entire philosophical 
program is based on this notion. Our analysis, 
therefore, takes the book Intentionality, origi-
nally published in 1983, as its starting point. 
Right in the Introduction, Searle makes it 
clear that the fundamental aim of the book is to 
provide a foundation for his previous two books 
on language.13 In other words, what he intends 
to do is to explain the essential characteristics of 
language starting from the fundamental charac-
teristics of the mind. However, in the next pages, 
he reveals a much more ambitious project, 
which involves both the solution to the mind-
body problem and a general explanation of hu-
man behavior.14 And it is precisely in the context 
of this broader project that the concept of inten-
tionality, considered as an irreducible feature of 
the human mind, is introduced. 
According to Searle himself, «Intentionali-
ty15 is that property of many mental states and 
events by which they are directed at or about or 
of objects and states of affairs in the world».16 
Thus, every belief implies something that is be-
lieved (e.g., “I believe in the existence of cor-
rupt politicians”), as every desire implies some-
thing that is desired (e.g., “I wish every politi-
cian involved in corruption would be arrested 
and removed from public life.”). It is worth not-
ing, however, that not all mental states have In-
tentionality. A state of generalized anxiety, for 
example, which is not directed at any particular 
situation, is a not an Intentional mental state. 
Likewise, still according to Searle, we must not 
confuse Intentionality with consciousness, 
since there are, on the one hand, unconscious 
Intentional states (e.g., a dormant fear), and, on 
the other, non-Intentional conscious states 
(e.g., a general feeling of well-being).17 In sum-
mary, Intentional mental states represent 
things and states of affairs in the world. 
Later, Searle provides a more detailed ac-
count of his theory. «Every Intentional state» - 
he says – «consists of an Intentional content in 
a psychological mode».18 This means that a sin-
gle Intentional content (the existence of cor-
rupt politicians) may be combined with differ-
ent psychological modes (belief, satisfaction, 
indignation, etc.), and a single psychological 
mode (belief) may be associated with several 
Intentional contents (the existence of corrupt 
politicians, the corruption of the legal system in 
general, etc.) In addition, every psychological 
state has a condition of satisfaction with regard 
to that which is necessary for its being success-
ful.19 For example, my belief in the existence of 
corrupt politicians will only be satisfied if in-
deed at least one corrupt politician has existed 
or still exists, my wish that those involved in 
corruption be arrested will only be satisfied if 
they are indeed arrested, and so on. 
Another central point of Searle’s theory is 
the distinction between intrinsic and derived 
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Intentionality, which allows us to understand 
the relationship between mind and language. 
Only mental states are intrinsically Intentional, 
in the sense that Intentionality is a basic and 
irreducible characteristic of the mind. Speech 
acts, which involve a physical realization (e.g., a 
sound, a graphic sign, a gesture), have their In-
tentionality derived from that primitive Inten-
tionality of the mind.20 Human actions (e.g., my 
commute from home to the university to give a 
lecture) also derive their meanings from human 
intentions, which are a type of primitive Inten-
tional state.21 But how is this possible? How does 
this transmission of intentionality occur? 
To explain this possibility, Searle uses the 
concept of Intentional causation, which is a 
kind of efficient causality related to the capaci-
ty of the mind to impose Intentionality on non-
Intentional entities and phenomena.22 In the 
case of human action, for example, an Inten-
tional state (my intention to give a lecture) 
causes a movement of my body (my commute 
to the university), and it is in the experience of 
the action itself that we become aware of the 
existence of that causation. It is, therefore, 
through this kind of efficient causality that the 
mind interacts with the non-mental world, 
generating linguistic events, communication 
with other organisms, social institutions, etc. 
Our presentation of Searle’s theory thus far 
is still insufficient to address the central prob-
lem of this article, since we have not touched 
on the question of the brain processes involved. 
One could ask: but, after all, what is the rela-
tionship between the theory of intentionality 
and biological naturalism? Or, more specifical-
ly, how can the Intentional states approach 
solve the mind-brain problem? 
In fact, throughout the first nine chapters, 
what Searle does is simply defend the actual ex-
istence of a class of primitive, irreducible and 
non-eliminable basic primitive mental phenom-
ena: the Intentional states. However, by opting 
at the beginning to do a primarily logical analysis 
of Intentionality (in terms of Intentional con-
tents, conditions of satisfaction, etc.), he must 
restrict himself to the description of its basic fea-
tures, without being able to say anything about 
the ultimate reality of these phenomena. Never-
theless, it is precisely to overcome this limitation 
that he changes direction in the tenth and final 
chapter of his book, trying to show how mental 
states are actually present in the natural world. 
In this context, the expression “biological natu-
ralism” appears for the first time: 
 
On my account, mental states are as real as 
any other biological phenomena, as real as 
lactation, photosynthesis, mitosis, or diges-
tion. Like these other phenomena, mental 
states are caused by biological phenomena 
and in turn cause other biological phenom-
ena. If one wanted a label, one might call 
such a view  “biological naturalism”.23 
 
To defend the viability of his proposal, 
Searle uses two different arguments. In the first, 
he says there is no problem in assuming that 
mental states are at the same time caused by 
the brain and realized in the brain. To illustrate 
how this would be possible, he uses an analogy 
with the property of water being liquid: 
 
The relation between the molecular behav-
ior and the surface physical characteristics 
of the water is clearly causal. If, for example, 
we alter the molecular behavior, we cause 
the surface features to change; we get either 
ice or steam depending on whether the mo-
lecular movement is sufficiently slower or 
faster [...] The liquidity of a bucket of water 
is not some extra juice secreted by the H2O 
molecules. When we describe the stuff as 
liquid we are just describing those very mol-
ecules at a higher level of description than 
that of the individual molecule.24 
 
In the second argument, Searle addresses 
the question of Intentional causation. How is it 
possible to explain, for example, that the inten-
tion to lift my arm is the cause of the fact that 
my arm is being raised? Once again, he appeals 
to an analogy with the physical world: 
 
Consider the explosion in the cylinder of a 
four-cycle internal combustion engine. The 
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explosion is caused by the firing of the spark 
plug, even though both the firing and the 
explosion are caused by and realized in 
phenomena at a micro level, at which level 
of description terms like “firing” and “ex-
plosion” are entirely inappropriate. Analo-
gously, I want to say that the intention in 
action causes the bodily movement even 
though both the intention in action and the 
bodily movement are caused by and real-
ized in a microstructure at which level terms 
like “intention in action” and “bodily 
movement” are inappropriate.25 
 
At the end of his presentation, Searle admits 
that his analogies are imperfect and that, in 
fact, we have no idea of how the brain produces 
Intentional mental states. However, he clearly 
believes in the future progress of neuroscience 
as the key to solving the problem: 
 
For all we know the type of realizations that 
Intentional states have in the brain may be 
describable at a much higher functional lev-
el than that of the specific biochemistry of 
the neurons involved. My own speculation, 
and at the present state of our knowledge of 
neurophysiology it can only be speculation, 
is that if we come to understand the opera-
tion of the brain in producing Intentionali-
ty, it is likely to be on principles that are 
quite different from those we now employ, 
as different as the principles of quantum 
mechanics are from the principles of New-
tonian mechanics.26 
 
█ Consciousness as a biological phenomenon 
 
One year later, Searle published Mind, 
Brain and Science, where he again defends the 
biological naturalism outlined above, reinforc-
ing and further expanding the scope of his 
analogies with physics through the macro- 
and micro-structural levels of description. 
This time, however, on presenting the basic 
features of mental phenomena, he says that 
«the most important of these features is con-
sciousness»,27 and also that it «is the central 
fact of the specifically human existence».28 
This means that Intentionality ceases to be 
Searle’s central target, giving way to the 
broader problem of consciousness. However, 
not yet having a more precise definition and 
treatment of the problem, does not prevent 
Searle from saying that his solution is simple: 
we do not know how, but we are certain that 
specific electrochemical activities between 
neurons cause consciousness.29  
It is only with The Rediscovery of the Mind, 
published in 1992, that Searle presents for the 
first time a systematic treatment of conscious-
ness, thus justifying his earlier declaration that 
it is the mental phenomenon par excellence. In 
the Introduction, he reiterates that he considers 
consciousness to be the principal mental phe-
nomenon and sets as one of the objectives of 
the book offering «a serious examination of 
conscience on its own terms».30 Thus, he in-
tends to overcome what he sees as the main 
misconceptions of the philosophical tradition 
(dualism, materialism, etc.) and to lay the 
foundation for an innovative approach to men-
tal life. Let us see how this happens. 
After denying the possibility of a precise 
definition of consciousness, whether in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions, or by the 
method of genus et differentia, Searle announces 
his goal of placing it as a natural phenomenon 
within the scientific worldview. And it is pre-
cisely here that we receive the first big news of 
the book: he presents two scientific theories he 
considers to be already proven and unques-
tionable, namely, the atomic theory of matter 
and the theory of evolution. The former states 
that subatomic particles and their causal and 
systemic relationships are the ultimate reality 
of the universe, so that many macro-pheno-
mena can always be explained by micro-
phenomena (e.g., water boils because the re-
leased kinetic energy increases the internal 
pressure of the H2O molecules). The latter the-
ory analyzes biological phenomena in terms of 
the genetic mechanisms that, acting at the mo-
lecular level, produce the molar characteristics 
of living beings (e.g., plants perform photosyn-
thesis because their biochemical structure de-
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termines the secretion of auxin, causing the 
leaves to turn toward the sun). It is, therefore, 
in relationship to both theories that Searle sees 
the only possibility of understanding con-
sciousness.31 As a summary of his proposal, he 
presents the following picture: 
 
Our world picture, though extremely com-
plicated in detail, provides a rather simple 
account of the mode of existence of con-
sciousness. According to the atomic theory, 
the world is made up of particles. These 
particles are organized into systems. Some 
of these systems are living, and these types 
of living systems have evolved over long pe-
riods of time. Among these, some have 
evolved brains that are capable of causing 
and sustaining consciousness. Conscious-
ness is, thus, a biological feature of certain 
organisms in exactly the same sense of “bio-
logical” in which photosynthesis, mitosis, 
digestion and reproduction are biological 
features of organisms.32 
 
Soon after, however, Searle acknowledges 
that conscious states have a particularity not 
found in other natural phenomena: subjectivity. 
And he understands this characteristic in onto-
logical terms, that is, it concerns a way of being. 
When, for example, I am sad, it is a phenome-
non that exists only for me, in the first person. If 
I were eliminated from the experience, that sad-
ness would immediately cease to exist. Another 
person can believe me, understand and even 
empathize with my sadness, but he or she cannot 
feel “my” sadness. It is inherent to consciousness, 
therefore, to exist always for someone, to be al-
ways tied to a subject. However, this mode of 
being entails an epistemological problem, in that 
consciousness, being essentially a first-person 
phenomenon, cannot be understood in the 
third-person perspective, like other natural phe-
nomena. This is the reason why we can never 
observe another person’s consciousness, but only 
his expressions and behavior.33 
The next step is to explain this irreducible 
ontology of the mental. It is at this point that 
Searle introduces another innovation in his ap-
proach, namely, the defense of emergentism. 
Again, the strategy consists in offering analo-
gies with other examples from the natural 
world. Let us suppose, for example, according 
to Searle, the existence of a particular chair. 
This chair, considered as a system of molecules, 
has some characteristics, such as its overall 
shape and its total weight, which are not char-
acteristics of any of its individual molecules, 
only of the system as a whole, but that can be 
deduced from the combination and arrange-
ment of those individual elements. There are, 
however, other characteristics of the “chair” 
system, such as solidity, which cannot be un-
derstood only by the composition of the indi-
vidual molecules, requiring an explanation in 
terms of their causal interactions. In this case, 
we would be facing a causally emergent charac-
teristic of the system.34 Based on these analo-
gies, Searle sees no difficulty in explaining this 
aspect of consciousness: 
 
On these definitions, consciousness is a 
causally emergent property of systems. It is 
an emergent feature of certain systems of 
neurons in the same way that solidity and 
liquidity are emergent features of systems of 
molecules. The existence of consciousness 
can be explained by the causal interactions 
between elements of the brain at the micro 
level, but consciousness cannot itself be de-
duced or calculated from the sheer physical 
structure of the neurons without some addi-
tional account of the causal relations be-
tween them.35 
 
But would this not represent a form of re-
ductionism? According to Searle, we can say 
that his position implies a causal reduction, to 
differentiate it from other forms of reduction 
(logical, theoretical, ontological), but his main 
concern is to prove that his proposal does not 
entail an ontological reduction. In other words, 
although consciousness is a causally emergent 
property of neuronal processes, and its exist-
ence can be thus explained, it is not possible to 
reduce it ontologically, saying, for example, that 
it is nothing more than that same set of cerebral 
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processes X that causes it, because, in this case, 
we would be losing sight of its very subjective 
characteristic.36 
This leaves unanswered the question of why 
only this phenomenon or property of the natu-
ral world resists an ontological reduction, while 
in all other cases a causal reduction implies an 
ontological reduction. Why, after all, can we 
not redefine sadness in terms of the underlying 
neurochemical processes, in the same way that 
we redefine heat in terms of the kinetic energy 
of molecules? The answer, according to Searle, 
is that in the former case we cannot neglect the 
subjectivity of the experience in question, as it 
is the very reality that we want to investigate.37 
Finally, even acknowledging the irreducibil-
ity of consciousness, Searle insists that through-
out this discussion there is no mystery involved 
at all. It is only a consequence of the mode of 
knowledge that we choose. Nothing prevents, 
however, an epistemic revolution from happen-
ing in the future, thus enabling an ontological 
reduction. 
 
Consciousness fails to be reducible, not be-
cause of some mysterious feature, but simp-
ly because by definition it falls outside the 
pattern of reduction that we have chosen to 
use for pragmatic reasons. Pretheoretically, 
consciousness, like solidity, is a surface fea-
ture of certain physical systems. [...] When I 
speak of the irreducibility of consciousness, 
I am speaking of its irreducibility according 
to standard patterns of reduction. No one 
can rule out a priori the possibility of a ma-
jor intellectual revolution that would give us 
a new – and at present unimaginable – con-
ception of reduction, according to which 
consciousness would be reducible.38 
 
After the publication of The Rediscovery of 
the Mind, Searle has addressed the problem of 
consciousness in other works, among which 
The Mystery of Consciousness  and, more recent-
ly, Biological Naturalism stand out. However, as 
there is no change in the structure of his argu-
ments and no new elements in his approach, we 
can say that these works simply repeat the same 
elements presented here: consciousness as a bi-
ological phenomenon caused by the brain; 
analogies with biological functions such as di-
gestion.39 However, as in previous works, Searle 
acknowledges that we still do not know how 
the brain causes the mind, which leads us to 
postpone its definitive solution. 
 
█ Criticisms of Searle’s approach  
 
Despite Searle’s self-confidence, his biologi-
cal naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain 
problem, especially to the problem of con-
sciousness, presents some problems and incon-
sistencies, and has received many criticisms, 
which I would now like to analyze and discuss. 
As a whole, Searle’s position has been criti-
cized for not offering any scientific novelty, for 
only restating an old commonsensical and pop-
ular view of mind. Dennett, for example, finds 
in Searle’s Rediscovery of Mind a kind of popu-
lar psychology: «Unsullied common sense is 
his chief ally, and his frequent invocations of 
common sense and its endorsement of his 
views give the book a characteristic populist 
flavor».40 Along the same lines, Churchland 
contrasts Searle’s book with real science:  
 
What Searle’s book resolutely rediscovers is 
not the mind, but our commonsense, presci-
entific, folk-psychological conception of the 
mind. The aim of science, by contrast, is to 
discover a new and better conception. In this 
endeavor, Searle’s book is not likely to help.41 
 
This line of criticism is not fruitful, unless 
one can accomplish two things: a) a systematic 
exposition of the fundamental tenets of so-
called folk psychology or common-sense psy-
chology, which would allow us to compare 
and classify similar theories; b) an empirical 
proof of a scientific theory which is radically 
opposed to the former, something both au-
thors believe will happen in the future. Unfor-
tunately, neither Dennett nor Churchland ac-
complish either, which leads me to the conclu-
sion that their criticism is vague and has only a 
rhetorical character.42  
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The real difficulties with Searle’s approach 
lie elsewhere. First, Searle does not seem to be 
too far from the philosophical tradition he crit-
icizes and wants to overcome. Despite his re-
peated claims that his biological naturalism is 
novel with respect to its predecessors, what one 
can easily see, in fact, is a repetition of several 
elements from this same tradition. It is impos-
sible not to note, for example, the influence of 
Brentano and Husserl on his theory of inten-
tionality, neither of whom Searle ever quotes or 
mentions.    
Likewise, the analogies employed by Searle 
between consciousness and biological functions 
such as digestion have been extensively used by 
materialists of different sorts since at least the 
eighteenth century, as I have shown elsewhere.43 
Let us consider, for example, the following cita-
tions of two leading representatives of material-
ism from different cultural traditions: 
 
To form an accurate idea of the operations 
from which thought results, it is necessary 
to consider the brain as a special organ de-
signed especially to produce it, as the stom-
ach and the intestines are designed to make 
the digestion, the liver to filter bile, the pa-
rotids and maxillary and sublingual glands 
to prepare the salivary juices.44 
…   
I think that every natural scientist, who 
thinks in a logical way and with consistency, 
will come to the conclusion that all those 
capacities that we apprehend under the 
concept of mental activities are only func-
tions of the brain substance; or, to express 
myself here in a more rudimentary way, 
that thoughts relate to the brain in the same 
way as the bile to the liver or urine to the 
kidneys.45    
 
From these passages, we can easily see that 
Searle is repeating a very old discourse on how 
to conceive of the brain causing or producing 
the mind. There is nothing new at all, despite 
Searle’s conviction that he is presenting a novel 
approach to the subject. 
Moreover, contrary to Searle’s intention to 
avoid Cartesianism,46 his theory of conscious-
ness reproduces some Cartesian elements, in-
cluding the thesis that consciousness is the es-
sence of the mental. This has led some of his 
critics to see his theory as a new form of Carte-
sianism.47 Churchland, for example, states that 
«what unites him with Descartes is his firm in-
sistence that mental phenomena form an onto-
logically distinct class of natural phenomena».48  
Finally, the categories with which Searle 
constructs his arguments come from the same 
tradition he wants to avoid (subjective x objec-
tive, first-person x third person, etc.). Here he 
comes to mention some philosophers within 
the contemporary philosophy of mind, who 
have before him defended the irreducibility of 
consciousness, like Thomas Nagel49 and Frank 
Jackson.50 However, according to him, they 
have mistakenly treated subjectivity as merely 
epistemic, while for him it is ontological. This 
could constitute in fact the novelty of his con-
tribution: to reconstruct the epistemic argu-
ment as an ontological one. Unfortunately, his 
efforts notwithstanding, Searle does not suc-
ceed in presenting an independent ontological 
construal, since everything he says is based up-
on the epistemic properties of human experi-
ence, as Churchland has also noted.51 In the 
end, he gives no pure ontological criteria for 
discriminating mental states and processes as 
being in principle irreducible to brain states 
and processes, thus failing to fulfill his promise.      
To sum up, despite his declarations to the 
contrary, Searle has not been able to escape the 
philosophical and theoretical tradition that he 
sees as fundamentally mistaken. Besides that, 
his position on the subject brings no big novelty 
to the debates in the field. Let us now analyze 
the way he presents his ideas. 
Regarding the structure of his arguments, 
Searle’s approach is anchored in at least three 
fundamental theses: 1) consciousness is a bio-
logical phenomenon, that is, physical; 2) it is 
entirely caused by the behavior of cerebral mi-
cro-phenomena; 3) it has causal power.  
Starting with the thesis of mental causation 
(thesis 3), it is important to mention Kim’s cri-
tique.52 According to Kim, if a mental state X 
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has causal power over another mental state Y, 
then Searle has to accept two sufficiently dis-
tinct causes for a mental event: a mental phe-
nomenon and a biological phenomenon. How-
ever, Kim argues, if every mental event can be 
causally explained by a biological process, why 
appeal to its mental cause? If an intention Y 
was caused by the desire X, why not replace it 
with its causal biological processes? 
Still concerning mental causation, we 
should ask how exactly consciousness, which 
is an emergent cerebral property, is able to 
cause, for example, the movement of my arm? 
Searle admits only, as an obvious fact, that it 
happens, but never explains the manner in 
which this happens.  
But the main problems of Searle’s proposal, 
in my view, are related to theses 1 and 2. First, 
Searle seems to have an obsolete and simplified 
view of the working of the human brain. As 
Freeman and Skarda53 have pointed out, he still 
understands the overall functioning of the 
brain in terms of the behavior of neurons, 
whereas many scientists have abandoned the 
cellular level of explanation. In fact, it is worth 
adding that there are now several competing 
theoretical models of the brain. So, it would be 
necessary to first to decide which one is the 
candidate for explaining consciousness, in or-
der to subsequently judge its adequacy.54 This 
means that Searle’s model is far from corre-
sponding to a model of the human brain well 
accepted in contemporary science, to which he 
claims to be faithful. 
I would like to discuss further his thesis of 
the causal relationship between the macro and 
micro levels. If reality, as Searle states, is actual-
ly composed of particles in hierarchical rela-
tionships, it seems then arbitrary to determine 
that consciousness as a physical phenomenon 
should be explained by the neuronal level of ac-
tivity, unless we have a good justification for 
this. Why not appeal to the level of molecules, 
atoms or subatomic particles? Why not seek 
explanation for cerebral phenomena in quan-
tum physics, as seems to be the new scientific 
hope? The atomic theory of matter accepted by 
Searle does not predict a priori any ontological 
privilege at any level of activity of the particles, 
which makes, in my view, his proposal arbitrary 
and lacking in scientific evidence. Moreover, 
Hannay55 noted that the bottom-up relationship 
defended by Searle to explain natural phenom-
ena is over simplified, in that it isolates mole-
cules from their dynamic context, thus ignoring 
top-down systemic influences. In this case, con-
sciousness could not be entirely explained by 
bottom-up causation, as Searle states.  
It is true that he sometimes shows aware-
ness of the hypothetical character of his model, 
when he says, for example: 
 
I have been mostly talking as if the neuron 
is the basic functional unit, and perhaps that 
is right. But at the present we do not know 
that it is right. [...] It might turn out that the 
functioning causal mechanisms require lots 
of neurons, as is suggested by Edelman’s ex-
planations at the level of neuronal maps, or 
perhaps the explanatory units are much 
smaller than neurons, as is suggested by 
Penrose’s discussion of microtubules.56 
 
This does not stop him, however, from con-
tinuing to talk as if it had already been demon-
strated that or how the brain causes or produc-
es the mind.  
The great weakness of Searle’s proposal, 
however, lies in its incoherence and incon-
sistency. First, biological naturalism is, contrary 
to what he continues to assert,57 a form of dual-
ism, in that it involves two very distinct types of 
biological phenomena: one with subjective on-
tology and another with objective ontology. To 
classify this new kind of dualism, Corcoran 
coined the term “biological dualism”.58 But how 
is it that a property of the brain can be accessi-
ble only to itself (consciousness) and how could 
the natural world have bifurcated this way, 
producing subjective and objective biological 
properties? Unfortunately, Searle does not offer 
an explanation for this curious fact.  
Another point related to the inconsistency 
of biological naturalism is that the analogies 
presented by Searle are irrelevant to the under-
standing of consciousness. Comparing the so-
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lidity of a rock or the liquidity of water to a 
conscious state is to lose sight of the very es-
sence of the phenomenon under investigation. 
Now, if all emergent physical properties can be 
observed in the third-person, with the sole ex-
ception of consciousness, which can only be ac-
cessed in the first-person, what is exactly the 
sense of comparing it with phenomena from 
which it diverges? And if there is no other 
emergent physical property comparable to con-
sciousness, then what is the reason for insisting 
on the fact that it is still a physical phenome-
non? Here as well, Searle offers us no answer. 
I would like to consider, finally, Searle’s con-
tradictory statements relating to the biological 
nature of consciousness, which reinforce my 
assumption of the inconsistency of his biologi-
cal naturalism. Since he first used this term in 
his book Intentionality, he has repeated that the 
solution to the mind-brain problem is simple 
and that there is no mystery regarding con-
sciousness, as it is a biological phenomenon as 
natural as digestion. Simultaneously, however, 
Searle himself has also repeated for nearly 30 
years that we do not have the slightest idea of 
how this would be possible. In one of his most 
recent works, he again recognizes the difficulty: 
«As yet, nobody knows the answer to these 
questions – how consciousness is caused by 
cerebral processes and how it is carried out in 
the brain?»59 Nevertheless, if no one knows the 
answer, what sense is there in a statement like 
«we know in fact that brain processes cause 
consciousness»?60     
 
█ Final remarks  
 
Our brief presentation and discussion of 
Searle’s biological naturalism had the objective 
of highlighting the essential characteristics of 
his proposal. We are aware that some details 
could not be dealt with here due to space re-
strictions. However, this does not prevent us 
from concluding our analysis with a general as-
sessment of the same. 
Based on what has been presented, we can 
say that Searle’s biological naturalism presents 
serious difficulties. If our analysis is correct, it is 
inconsistent, which disqualifies it as a theory of 
explaining consciousness and mental phenom-
ena in general. Now, if it is not possible to re-
duce the first-person ontology of consciousness 
to the third person ontology of traditional bio-
logical phenomena, how can a philosopher or 
scientist explain consciousness via the brain, 
that is, in the third person? The overall pro-
posal is, therefore, unachievable, if we accept 
Searle’s own premises. 
But if biological naturalism cannot be a the-
ory per se, what status could be conferred upon 
it? In truth, it seems to resemble more a proph-
ecy, anchored in a dogmatic and, in my view, 
ingenuous attitude toward modern science. 
Like almost all prophecies, Searle does not an-
nounce the precise date of its fulfillment, be-
cause if announced, he would be running a se-
rious risk of being refuted. Instead, he only 
provides very general and vague ideas, so that 
they can continue to be maintained indefinitely 
as a promise to be fulfilled in an indefinite fu-
ture. Maybe it is exactly this feature that has 
allowed Searle to maintain it already for thirty 
years, even without any empirical evidence, 
something which would hardly be conceded to 
a scientific theory. What Searle has to offer, 
therefore, is not even remotely a solution to the 
problem of consciousness, but simply the repe-
tition of an old rhetorical strategy, which can be 
renewed indefinitely. In his attempt to trans-
form the mystery of consciousness into the 
problem of consciousness, all he has managed 
to do is create a new mystery, to which he does 
not know the solution. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 B. SMITH, John Searle: From Speech Acts to Social 
Reality, in: B. SMITH (ed.), John Searle, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 1-33, here 
p. 29. 
2 See J. SEARLE, Speech Acts, Cambridge University 
Press, New York 1969; J. SEARLE, Expression and 
Meaning, Cambridge University Press, New York 
1979.  
3 See J. SEARLE, Intentionality, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge 1983; J. SEARLE, Minds, 
Brains and Science, Harvard University Press, 
 
Searle’s New Mystery 
 
11 
 
Cambridge (MA) 1984; J. SEARLE, The Rediscovery 
of Mind, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1992. 
4  See J. SEARLE, The Construction of Social Reality, 
Free Press, New York 1995; J. SEARLE, Mind, Lan-
guage and Society, Basic Books, New York 1998. 
5 See J. SEARLE, Rationality in Action, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge (MA) 2001; J. SEARLE, Mind: A 
Brief Introduction, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford 2004; J. SEARLE, Freedom and Neurobiology, 
Columbia University Press, New York 2006; J. 
SEARLE, Making the Social World, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 2010. 
6 See J. SEARLE, The Rediscovery of Mind, cit; J. 
SEARLE, The Mystery of Consciousness, Basic 
Books, New York 1997; J. SEARLE, Biological Nat-
uralism, in: M. VELMANS (ed.), Blackwell Com-
panion to Consciousness, Blackwell, London 2007, 
pp. 325-334. 
7 See A. DANTO, Naturalism, in: P. EDWARDS 
(ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. V, 
Macmillan, New York 1967, pp. 448-450. 
8 See D. PAPINEAU, Philosophical Naturalism, 
Blackwell, Oxford 1997. 
9 See P. MOSER, D. YANDELL, Farewell to Natural-
ism, in: W.L. CRAIG, J.P. MORELAND (eds.), Natu-
ralism: A Critical Analysis, Routledge, London 
2000, pp. 3-23: D. PAPINEAU, Naturalism, in: E. 
ZALTA (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Spring 2009 Edition. 
10 See W.L. CRAIG, P. MORELAND, Naturalism: A 
Critical Analysis, Routledge, London 2000. 
11 J. SEARLE, Biological Naturalism, cit., p. 325. 
12 See J. RUST, John Searle, Continuum, Lon-
don2009; B. SMITH, John Searle: From Speech Acts 
to Social Reality, cit.; S. TSOHATZIDIS (ed.), John 
Searle’s Philosophy of Language, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge (MA) 2007. 
13 See J. SEARLE, Speech Acts, cit; J. SEARLE, Expres-
sion and Meaning, cit. 
14 J. SEARLE, Intentionality, cit., pp. vii-x.   
15 To be faithful to Searle’s approach, I will follow 
from now on his capitalization of the words “in-
tentionality” and “intentional”.   
16 J. SEARLE, Intentionality, cit., p. 1. 
17 Ivi, p. 2. 
18 Ivi, p. 12 – italics in the original. 
19 Ivi, pp. 10-13. 
20 See ivi, pp. 26-27 
21 See ivi, chap. III. 
22 See ivi, pp. 117-132. 
23 Ivi, p. 264. 
24 Ivi, pp. 265-266. 
 
 
25 Ivi, pp. 268-269. 
26 Ivi, p. 272. 
27 J. SEARLE, Minds, Brains and Science, cit., p. 15. 
28 Ivi, p. 16. 
29 Ivi, pp. 23-24.  
30 J. SEARLE, The Rediscovery of the Mind, cit., p. xi. 
31 See ivi, pp. 84-93. 
32 Ivi, pp. 92-93. 
33 See ivi, pp. 93-100. 
34 See ivi, p. 111.  
35 Ivi, p. 112. 
36 See ivi, pp. 113-116. 
37 See ivi, pp. 116-122. 
38 Ivi, pp. 122-124. 
39 For example, in The Mystery of Consciousness, 
Searle claims: «in my view, we have to abandon 
dualism and start with the assumption that con-
sciousness is an ordinary biological phenomenon 
comparable with growth, digestion, or the secre-
tion of bile» (J. SEARLE, The Mistery of Conscious-
ness, cit. p. 6). 
40 D. DENNETT, Review of “The Rediscovery of the 
Mind”, in: «The Journal of Philosophy», vol. XC, 
n. 4, 1993, pp. 193-205. 
41 P. CHURCHLAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of Con-
sciousness, in: P.M. CHURCHLAND, P.S. CHURCH-
LAND (eds.), On the Contrary. Critical Essays, 
1987-1997, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 
1998, pp. 113-122, here p. 122.   
42 I have argued elsewhere that Churchland’s concep-
tion of a unitary folk psychology is very loose and prob-
lematic, and that at least some psychological theories 
which would thus fall under his general label of “folk 
psychology” (for example, in social experimental psy-
chology) are indeed in accordance with his theses. See 
S.F. ARAUJO, Psicologia e neurociência: uma avaliação da 
perspectiva materialista no estudo dos fenômenos mentais, 
2nd edition, EDUFJF, Juiz de Fora 2011. 
43 See S.F. ARAUJO, Psicologia e neurociência: uma 
avaliação da perspectiva materialista no estudo dos 
fenômenos mentais, cit. S.F. ARAUJO, Materialism’s 
eternal return: recurrent patterns of materialistic 
explanations of mental phenomena, in: A. MOREIRA-
ALMEIDA, F.S. SANTOS (eds.), Exploring Frontiers of 
the Mind-Brain Problem, Springer, New York 2012, 
pp. 3-15.  
44 P. CABANIS, Rapports du physique et du moral de 
l’homme, t. I, seconde édition, Crapelet, Paris 
1805, pp. 152-153. 
45 K. VOGT, Physiologische Briefe für Gebildete al-
ler Stände (1847), in: D. WITTICH (Hrsg.), Schrif-
ten zum kleinbürgerlichen Materialismus in 
 
 Araujo 
 
12 
 
Deutschland, Bd. I, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1971, 
pp. 1-24, here p. 17. 
46 See J. SEARLE, Response: The Mind-Body Problem, 
in: E. LEPORE, R. VAN GULICK (eds.), John Searle and 
His Critics, Blackwell, London 1993, pp. 141-146. 
47 See D.M. ARMSTRONG, Searle’s Neo-Cartesian 
Theory of Consciousness, in: E. VILLANUEVA (ed.), 
Consciousness: Philosophical Topics 1, Ridgeview, 
Atascadero (CA) 1991, pp. 67-71; P. CHURCH-
LAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of Consciousness, cit. 
48 P. CHURCHLAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of Con-
sciousness, cit., p. 114. 
49 See T. NAGEL, What is it like to be a bat?, in: 
«The Philosophical Review», vol. LXXXIII, n. 4, 
1974, pp. 435-450. 
50 See F. JACKSON, Epiphenomenal Qualia, in: 
«The Philosophical Review», vol. XXXII, n. 127, 
1982, pp. 127-136. 
51 See P. CHURCHLAND, Betty Crocker’s Theory of 
Consciousness, cit. 
52 See J. KIM, Mental Causation in Searle’s “Biological 
Naturalism”, in: «Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research», vol. LV, n. 1, 1995, pp. 189-194. 
53 See W. FREEMAN, C. SKARDA, Mind/Brain Sci-
ence: Neuroscience on Philosophy of Mind, in: E. 
LEPORE, R. VAN GULICK (eds.), John Searle and 
His Critics, cit., pp. 115-127.   
54 There is now a strong appeal to quantum me-
chanics as the ultimate frame of reference for un-
derstanding how the human brain gives rise to 
consciousness. See e.g. S. HAMEROFF, R. PENROSE, 
Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in 
brain microtubules: A Model for consciousness?, in: 
S.R. HAMEROFF, A.W. KASZNIAK, A.C. SCOTT 
(eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness – The 
First Tucson Discussions and Debates, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge (MA) 1996, pp. 507-540; S. HA- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEROFF,  Quantum  Computation in Brain Microtu-
bules. The Penrose-Hameroff “OrchOR” Model of 
Consciousness, in: «Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London», Series A, n. 356, 
pp. 1869-1896; J. STATINOVER, The Quantum 
Brain, John Wiley & Sons, New York 2002; J. 
TUSZYNSKYI (ed.), The Emerging Physics of Con-
sciousness, Springer, New York 2006. However, a 
closer look at this debate reveals huge conceptual 
problems and strong disagreements on how to 
conceive and interpret quantum mechanics, since 
the latter has also been used to defend new ver-
sions of dualism. See e.g. M. BEAUREGARD, Brain 
Wars, Harper One, New York 2012; C. CLARKE, 
No-collapse Physics and Consciousness, in: A. 
MOREIRA-ALMEIDA, F.S. SANTOS (eds.), Exploring 
Frontiers of the Mind-Brain Problem, cit., pp. 55-
78; H.P. STAPP, Quantum Interactive Dualism, in: 
«Zygon», vol. XLI, n. 3, 2006, pp. 599-616. This 
is obviously a logical absurdity, which must be 
eliminated before we can take quantum mechan-
ics seriously as an explanation of consciousness or 
as a solution to the mind-brain problem. 
55 See A. HANNAY, Consciousness and the Experi-
ence of Freedom, in: E. LEPORE, R. VAN GULICK 
(eds.), John Searle and His Critics, cit., pp. 129-
139. 
56 J. SEARLE, The Mystery of Consciousness, cit., p. 
198. 
57 See J. SEARLE, Making the Social World, cit., 
chap. VIII. 
58 See K. CORCORAN, The Trouble with Searle’s 
Biological Naturalism, in: «Erkenntnis», vol. LV, 
n. 3, 2001, pp. 307-324. 
59 J. SEARLE, Making the Social World, cit., p. 26.   
60 J. SEARLE, The Mystery of Consciousness, cit., p. 
191 – italics in the original. 
